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distance across territory but circumstances without distance and relatively disconnected from particular location.' 3 Furthermore, an accelerating power asymmetry is assumed to have emerged between: on the one hand, governments which are locked into a specific geographical structure -their own national territory; and, on another, global capital markets which operate at a higher level of abstract spatiality -the 'supraterritorial'.
Viewed through the perspective of an increasing powerlessness of the state, we see the emergence of the central claim of the globalisation hypothesis. With reference to economic policy in particular, national states are now typically thought to have little capacity to act autonomously. As a reflection of the 'inevitable logic of globalisation', the new conventional wisdom of contemporary public policy assumes that the focus of economic policy-making has been displaced from the national state into global markets.
It is plain to see, therefore, that a whole host of political consequences will emerge from the formulation of knowledge about globalisation. Hence, it is imperative that such knowledge is based on accurate understandings of the global system, and of the economic transformations which are said to have been instrumental in the creation of such a system.
The remainder of this paper concentrates on arguably the most important aspect of these transformations: capital's supposed 'hyper-mobility'. In order to examine the relationship between the mobility of capital and the politics of globalisation, two distinctions in particular will be emphasised. The first is relatively well-rehearsed within the IPE literature and concerns the distinction between productive capitals and financial capitals. It will be shown that these different fractions of capital have conceptually distinct functions and logics of action; moreover, that such logics cohere into very 5 different mobility options. For example, the following section of the paper concentrates on the mobility of productive capitals. For these capitals, the reality of international capital flows does little to sustain the rhetoric of globalisation. Indeed, far from productive interests using a new-found mobility to establish a truly global circuit of capital, the available empirical evidence highlights that these interests have retained an essentially national identity.
Furthermore, such a conclusion appears to hold not only in relation to the mobility of productive capitals. In the second section of the paper, it is argued that the mobility of financial capitals is also routinely over-stated. Given that the spatial mobility hypothesis is a gross exaggeration of the reality of contemporary capital flows, it is necessary to dispute the assumption that economic globalisation implies a political logic of no alternative. Insofar as policy alternatives are circumscribed at all by the current structure of the international political economy of finance, this is the result of the distinctively neoliberal financial regime which has been created as a consequence of prior political interventions. In relaxing previously institutionalised controls on the short-term movement of financial funds, this neo-liberal regime has facilitated new opportunities for realising profit through trading short-term financial assets. As a result, an increasing proportion of available capital funds are being directed towards financial markets; the corollary of which is an emergent tendency towards capital shortage in productive sectors. A clear disparity now exists between the volume of funds being prepared for productive purposes and those being prepared for non-productive purposes. However, and despite the claims of contemporary conventional wisdoms, the heightened incidence 6 of productive capital shortage is not to be explained with reference to any 'logic' of globalisation, which sees capital depart the high-wage, high-cost locations of the west in search of lower-cost locations on the industrialising periphery. In short, productive capital shortage is not to be explained with reference to arguments about the spatial mobility of capital. Instead, it is the result of the current global neo-liberal financial regime providing a range of incentives for rationally-acting, profit-seeking capital investors to concentrate an ever larger proportion of their investments in financial assets.
Thus, the dynamics of productive capital shortage are to be understood in relation to arguments about the functional mobility of capital.
The heuristic distinction between the spatial mobility of capital and the functional mobility of capital is the second such distinction to be emphasised throughout this paper.
Whilst the existing IPE literature tends to concentrate on the political implications of capital's spatial mobility, this paper will focus in its later sections on capital's functional mobility. Indeed, the case for re-regulating both the global financial markets [see section two] and the financial futures markets [see section three] is made with direct reference to the functional mobility of capital. Given that the confines of space within which the paper is written do not allow for a detailed policy proposal to be presented, the paper emphasises instead the principles (both economic and political) which would inform a policy of re-regulation.
The desire to address the increasing incidence of productive capital shortage in the west lies at the heart of policy proposals to re-regulate the global financial markets. With this 7 end in mind, James Tobin, for example, has introduced proposals for an international currency transactions tax which aims to reduce the volatility of financial prices and restore some semblance of stability to domestic interest rates and exchange rates. 4 The creation of a highly liberalised global financial environment has, over the past twenty years, triggered a quite dramatic shift in the liquidity preferences of capital holders.
Short-term financial assets can now be traded in the virtual absence of transactions costs.
This has allowed investors to take up certain speculative positions which are capable of satisfying high liquidity demands. As such, the increasingly 'costless' nature of financial trading has offered sufficient incentives for investors to liquidate long-term productive assets in order to release more funds for financial investments. Moreover, these new flows of financial funds are frequently deployed to speculate against forward movements in interest and exchange rates; consequently, injecting new sources of instability into these rates. This in turn acts as a further disincentive to invest in new productive capacity and, hence, exacerbates what are now the significant capacity shortfalls visible in productive sectors visible throughout much of the west. Whilst this briefest of sketches of a Tobin-style tax suggests that its imposition would be driven by an essential economic logic, arguments for currency transactions taxes are just as much political arguments as they are economic arguments. As such, it is to the political implications of re-regulating financial markets that the paper turns in the concluding section.
It is in this sense, more than any other, that the 'P' is being put back into IPE: in this case, through the attempt to repoliticise the dominant discourse of globalisation by replacing the received wisdom of capital's spatial mobility with an understanding of capital's 8 functional mobility. The conventional focus on spatial mobility is rooted in the marginalist paradigm of neo-classical economics. This suggests that an autonomous sphere of market relations governs the locational decisions of firms in line with implicit cost/benefit analyses. Insofar as the alternative focus on functional mobility advanced here emphasises the political construction of financial market relations, then, this article also represents an attempt to repoliticise orthodox western economic discourse more generally. As such, it stands in direct opposition to those who would seek to unify social scientific enquiry in a new political economy which involved the application of orthodox economic methods to the analysis of political phenomena. 5 By contrast, it harks back to a pre-marginalist political economy to the extent that it moves away from a fundamentally neo-classical analysis of the means of choosing between competing ends in conditions of scarcity -embodied, in this instance, in the 'spatial mobility' hypothesis.
Instead, the image of the classical political economy of the nineteenth century, and especially of its concern for the social basis of capitalism, is invoked through the emphasis on the 'functional mobility' hypothesis. 
The internationalisation of production and the spatial mobility of capital
With capital mobility conceived of in spatial terms, productive capital is assumed to be free to roam the world in search of the most profitable locations. As a result, globalisation is assumed to have locked national states into a competitive dynamic in which they are pitted directly one against another in the struggle for supremacy on 9 international markets. The globalisation hypothesis consequently comes complete with its own blueprint for future political action: wake up and shape up to the demands of It is this dynamic, and not in any sense the 'natural laws of globalisation', which lies at the heart of the current inability of western labour markets to provide adequate levels of stable, high-quality employment. The growing casualisation and general underutilisation of the western workforce is a direct result of the capacity shortfalls which reflect capital shortage. As such, productive capital shortage should be understood in terms of an excessive volume of resources being devoted to financial transactions. In viewing the problems of contemporary political economy in this way, it is necessary to revise some of the claims which have been made about capital mobility, especially in circumstances in which capital mobility has been conceived of purely in spatial terms. 13 For example, Mittelman's assertion that 'flows of capital and technology must eventually touch down in distinct places' has been used to argue that the spatial mobility of capital is more limited than the dominant understanding of globalisation insists. Yet this argument must now be seen through a different lens. If we choose to interpret capital mobility in functional terms, then we will be drawn towards the conclusion that the main concern of today's public policy-makers should be that an increasing volume of capital does not now 'touch down' at all -in the sense of it failing to be made concrete into productive investments. Having shifted the debate away from the question of capital's spatial mobility, it is to the question of capital's functional immobility that the paper now turns.
The internationalisation of financial markets and the functional immobility of money assets
Since western governments began the indiscriminate relaxation of capital controls following the demise of the Bretton Woods settlement, the world's financial markets have become increasingly dissociated from the productive realm. As Kurt Hübner explains, financial markets no longer exist solely as a means of optimising financial portfolios; 'the money market itself has become a genuine realm for the valorisation of capital'. 16 As a reflection of heightened liquidity preferences amongst potential investors, an ever greater proportion of capital holdings have been switched from productive to financial assets. Consequently, an ever smaller proportion of money assets have been prepared for non-financial, or GDP, purposes. 17 Productive interests have 14 been 'crowded out' by financial interests to such an extent in recent years that, throughout the west, we are witness to a situation of acute productive capital shortage.
Today's international capital markets allow for short-term liquidity ratios to be maximised through the twenty-four-hour trading of money assets. At the same time, however, they are also responsible for fostering an aversion amongst capital investors for taking up longer-term positions. These markets offer such liquid contracts on short-term financial transactions that they remove many of the incentives for cashing in money assets and turning them into productive investments; the returns to which accrue over much longer time horizons. Moreover, the speed with which financial transactions can now be administered has impacted upon the trend level of interest rates in such a way so as to act as a further disincentive for engaging in productive investments. As Benn Steil argues: 'savers are now highly yield-sensitive' 18 and, as a result, demand greater compensation for giving up additional liquidity when they make their savings available to source new productive investments. Such compensation has tended to take the form of higher interest payments.
The history of the post-Bretton Woods international political economy shows that the trend level of interest rates has risen every time a further liberalisation of the financial environment has made it feasible for a subsequent increase in liquidity preferences to be satisfied. In general, the rate of interest is now appreciably higher than it was in the era in which financial flows were policed by capital controls. The overriding desire for financial liquidity, which has been made manifest in successive increases in the trend rate 15 of interest, has ensured that productive investors (especially in the small-and mediumsized firm sector) typically face excessive capital costs. The very prospect of these costs has, on many occasions, been sufficient to price potential investors out of production markets. Liquidity demands provide the dynamic, therefore, which ends with there being insufficient flows of investment to absorb all the excess supply currently observed in western labour markets.
The search for additional liquidity within international financial markets has sent shockwaves through western labour markets. Financial transactions can now easily be varied both in form and in geographical location. 19 Such flexibility has significantly lowered transactions costs, and the ever more 'costless' nature of financial trading has led to a massive increase in financial flows. Furthermore, over two-thirds of the flows of financial funds are now so-called 'stateless money'. This places it outside the effective control of national states and, as such, is assumed to have tied national governments to strict constraints in terms of liquidity ratios, interest rates and profit opportunities. As such, the high liquidity preferences which dominate contemporary financial markets also make expansionary changes to domestic monetary policy more difficult to administer.
Even modest uncertainty within the financial markets as to whether national governments will be able to resist the temptation to unilaterally expand their economies by lowering interest rates can result in significant moves in the 'sentiments' of the financial markets.
The markets can be expected to re-position themselves in order to re-assert the strict interest rate constraint which now appears to face all national governments. 20 Governments are assumed to be powerless to lower national interest rates below a trend 16 level which the markets find 'acceptable' in order to boost productive investment in the domestic economy. Set in this context, increasing financial market integration has effectively sealed off the expansionary option for national governments. For, in the conventional wisdom of globalisation, those holding capital assets are thought to be free to escape the effects of an expansionary monetary policy by re-locating elsewhere, into an environment in which the interest rate constraint is observed more closely.
Once again, in this understanding of the contemporary international political economy, capital mobility is being conceived of in spatial terms. Viewed through this perspective, the problem posed by international capital mobility is that the mere threat of extensive short-term financial outflows is often sufficient to deter a government from considering policies which may be treated with suspicion in the markets. 21 In circumstances in which market confidence is lost, rationally-acting capital investors will be expected to transfer their financial assets to another country, one in which the principles of 'sound money' are applied with greater vigour. Thus, with physical, statutory and technological barriers to shifting capital no longer considered to be effective in the face of capital's hypermobility, we have been conditioned to expect an ever increasing amount of cross-border short-term financial transactions. In the political rhetoric of globalisation, these transactions are designed to act as 'correctives' to national monetary authorities which temporarily step out of line and assert their theoretical independence in terms of domestic policy. 17 Historically, autonomous national monetary policy interventions have been aimed towards changing the settings of interest rates in order to restore internal balance to the domestic economy. Yet, as Tobin argues, 'vast funds are [now] prepared [solely] to arbitrage away differences in national interest rates'. 22 Thus, domestic interest rates increasingly are being determined through international financial markets which are thought to clear instantaneously. In this world of perfect spatial capital mobility, financial assets denominated in different currencies become perfect substitutes. 23 As such, they cannot offer divergent returns in different domestic currencies without at the same time sparking substantial financial flows. For, it is commonly assumed that those holding capital assets will take advantage of their supposedly unlimited mobility options to seek out those locations in which the highest rates of interest are to be found.
Moreover, it is further commonly assumed that the spatial mobility of capital will, over time, ensure that all domestic interest rates converge upon an international average.
However, the actual evidence regarding domestic interest rates does little to bear out this claim. As Robert Zevin has shown, the correlation between short-term interest rates in the world's major financial centres is now no higher than it was one hundred years ago. 24 The computer revolution is regularly assumed to have facilitated the instantaneous adjustment in financial prices, as massive flows of capital are released at the push of a button to trigger the adjustment mechanisms. As we can see here, though, even under such circumstances, these prices have shown no more of a tendency to converge than they did when their adjustment required for gold to be physically transported between the world's financial centres on ocean liners. Therefore, contrary to the predictions of the 18 financial globalisation hypothesis, we continue to live in a world of interest rate differentials. Viewed through the perspective of capital's spatial mobility, this suggests that savers around the world should be attracted to certain financial centres at the prospect of above-average interest rates. Indeed, it is stated clearly in the dominant rhetoric of globalisation that the integration of the world's financial markets allows for financial investors faced with low domestic interest rates simply to transfer their funds overseas. As such, savings are assumed to be more mobile than previously; and, as savers exploit these mobility options, the historic link observed between domestic investment and domestic saving is further assumed to be undermined. In fact, the two are no longer thought to bear any necessary relation. However, once again, empirical evidence does little to support this view. When the rate of domestic investment is regressed onto the rate of domestic saving, a significant correlation remains. 25 This suggests that international flows of long-term financial capital are more restricted than generally assumed. Far from long-term assets moving freely across borders, national economies remain more independent in spatial terms than the globalisation hypothesis would have us believe.
Such a conclusion suggests once more that current conventional wisdoms exaggerate both the extent of capital's spatial mobility and the extent to which such mobility circumscribes the autonomy of national economic policy-makers. 26 Yet, as is shown below, should we focus instead on capital's functional mobility, it is still possible to argue that the concentration of an increasing proportion of capital funds in purely speculative financial markets does threaten to undermine the policy autonomy of national 19 governments. The effects of the increase in speculative activities have been felt most spectacularly in the international foreign exchange markets. This is now the largest and most liquid financial market the world has ever known, with a daily turnover averaging more than US$1.2 trillion of short-term funds. 27 Currency trading incurs negligible transactions costs, allowing speculators easy access into markets and enabling them to profit from fluctuating interest and exchange rates. However, in recent years, it has become increasingly evident that speculative activities are not directed solely at existing differentials between countries in terms of interest and exchange rates. Vast sums of short-term assets are moved in anticipation of emerging differentials or even, as is becoming ever more common these days, to force such changes. The sheer volume of short-term capital movements associated with contemporary currency crises is out of all proportion to the underlying interest and exchange rate differentials in existence before the onset of speculative activities. 28 Instead, it is speculators themselves who whip up monetary storms by triggering capital movements of such magnitude that they ensure that adjustments in both interest and exchange rates must follow.
Speculative attacks pose a significant threat to national policy-makers because of the capacity that they bear to become self-fulfilling. 29 If market traders generate the expectation that a specific currency devaluation would prove to be in their interest, then they are able to make that devaluation a reality. Speculative capital outflows can be initiated at will to cause a run on any currency. In turn, this is likely to trigger a reaction from the relevant national monetary authorities, who can be expected to attempt to stabilise the level of their currency. This they will do by engaging in open market 20 operations, running down their official reserves to buy their own currency in the face of co-ordinated selling. However, this is not a game which governments can play indefinitely. It is a sobering thought for national policy-makers that the total official central bank reserves of all IMF member countries in aggregate is less than the equivalent of one day's turnover on the world's foreign exchange markets. 30 Given the weight of capital which can be deployed against a particular currency, therefore, no amount of concerted central bank resolve can ever stave off co-ordinated market attacks. Both governments and market dealers know that, should flows of private speculative capital be organised collectively with the specific aim to 'pick off' individual currencies, then such attacks will always succeed. This knowledge is sufficient in itself to act as a further endorsement of the incentive to speculate. As such, the rash of currency crises which currently plague the world's money markets often bear no relation to the state of underlying economic fundamentals. The foreign exchange market is dominated by shortterm speculators who, in their desire to maximise private liquidity ratios, purposefully undermine interest and exchange rate stability. These rates consequently display a greater volatility ceteris paribus than we would otherwise expect. Furthermore, they are frequently moved away, with long-term effect, from levels appropriate to underlying economic equilibria.
Such effects impact particularly severely on the real economy. For it is the level of interest rates which helps to shape investors' expectations in relation to the feasibility of funding future productive investments; and it is the level of exchange rates which helps to shape investors' expectations in relation to the likely market share such investments may 21 be able to capture. Should speculative activities move both interest and exchange rates above their trend level, 31 investors holding financial assets face reduced incentives to turn these assets into new productive capacity.
In such circumstances, it becomes increasingly difficult to sustain sufficient productive capacity to match labour market demand with supply. It is the systemic presence of excess labour supply which has made western labour so susceptible to globalisation's supposed 'logic of no alternative'. The erosion of statutory trade union rights; the growing casualisation of work in the advanced industrialised world; the exploitation of sweatshop economies by western multinationals; the official tolerance of mass unemployment in the European Union: the political costs incurred by western governments which allowed all of these adverse labour market trends to persist would no doubt be significantly increased in the absence of such acute productive capital shortage.
It is with this concern for labour standards foremost in mind that the case is put for reregulating financial markets as a means of restoring the full circuit of capital. Given that this would mean adjudicating between the contradictory interests of finance and labour by prioritising those of the latter, it should be clear that this is both an economic argument and a political argument. However, before such arguments are made, the focus of the paper is turned to the question of financial innovation. The development of a whole new genre of financial markets, those in financial futures, has increased liquidity ratios in these markets still further. As a consequence, futures markets act as yet more impediments to the restoration of the full circuit of capital and, as such, make the case for re-regulating international financial activity still more pressing. 22 
Financial futures and further impediments to the restoration of the full circuit of capital
A wide range of markets in financial futures now exists. A futures contract is entered into in an attempt to generate a high degree of certainty about the medium-term market price of a given asset. Indeed, the specified terms of the contract lock in that price at a non-negotiable level for the length of the contract. Futures operate most effectively, therefore, in markets such as those for interest and exchange rate futures, in which the prices of the underlying assets -in this case, interest and exchange rates themselves -are known to be volatile. Both short-term interest and exchange rates clearly do vary, often quite sharply from month to month or even from day to day. Moreover, the fluctuations in these rates often occur in a manner which is difficult to predict. As we have already seen, co-ordinated speculative attacks can move interest and exchange rate levels away from those that would be consistent with underlying economic fundamentals. The markets for financial futures were developed, then, in order to offer a means of reducing the risks associated with unpredictable short-term movements in interest and exchange rates. Underlying risks can be re-distributed through 'hedging mechanisms', allowing for portfolios to be 'immunised' through offsetting actions in related markets.
Therefore, the markets for financial derivatives emerged as a response to changes in the surrounding economic environment. As the institutional arrangements of the immediate 23 post-war era have been dismantled, the 'certainties' which these arrangements guaranteed have rapidly dissipated. The post-Bretton Woods era is one of increased interest and exchange rate risk, and new financial innovations have been developed in an attempt to reduce exposure to such risk. 32 Under a floating exchange rate regime, currency levels are determined according to the often volatile sentiments of the foreign exchange markets. This has generated new incentives to engage in hedging activities and, in turn, this has generated calls for new markets to meet such demands. Floating rates create exactly the sort of market tensions -those associated with excessive price volatilitywhich futures trading thrives on. As excessive volatility has become a seemingly permanent feature of modern-day financial markets, futures have emerged as an important part of modern finance. We have witnessed explosive growth in the range of available short-term financial instruments. Furthermore, as the issue volume of such instruments has shown a similar growth, activities in secondary financial markets now rivals that in primary financial markets as a means of diverting money away from the productive economy. Indeed, the fact that trading volumes for interest rate futures have intensified to such an extent that they now outnumber those for the related cash markets shows quite clearly the extent to which the full circuit of capital is now impeded.
Futures markets tend to offer unlimited access and, subsequently, are used routinely by an increasing number of participants. New investors have been attracted to derivatives markets as these markets have become ever more liquid. As Dennis Carlton argues, 'for financial instruments, futures markets can sometimes provide an almost perfect substitute to a cash purchase of a security'. 33 Moreover, futures markets have proved especially 24 successful at lowering transactions costs through the instantaneous nature of trading. As a result of the almost total elimination of transactions costs, Carlton raises the possibility that it may even be cheaper to undertake certain transactions in the futures markets than the cash markets. Derivatives markets clearly act as a complement to cash markets, therefore; and, as an increasing amount of financial activity becomes concentrated in futures, they may act more and more as direct substitutes for cash markets.
The derivatives contracts which have succeeded most often in displacing their cash market equivalents have tended to be those which are the most liquid in relative terms. 34 In these markets, the total open positions for financial futures regularly exceed those in the associated securities markets. For example, trading in stock index contracts is often more intense than is same-day trading on the international stock exchanges. 35 As such, we should not be surprised that prices in cash markets frequently reflect trading in the derivatives markets, and not vice versa. This should lead us immediately to revise our thinking about futures markets. As Steil asks: 'When Chicago futures prices lead NYSE cash prices, which product is, economically speaking, a 'derivative' of which?'. 36 Houthakker and Williamson raise the same issue when they write: 'To those accustomed to pre-futures ways, it is a clear case of the tail wagging the dog. The question arises, however, which is the tail and which is the dog?'. 37 Derivatives markets are now instrumental to the process through which prices are formed in cash markets. It is perhaps the supreme irony of derivatives trading that the extensive use of futures, ostensibly for the purpose of risk management, actually increases the overall risk and uncertainty in the economic system. Thus, the new world order of financial futures is one which injects fundamental disorder into other sectors of the economy. As Barbara
Carroll observes, there seem to be few obvious theoretical flaws in the assumption that futures markets should act to stabilise cash markets, but in practice it appears that the exact opposite has more typically been the case. 38 Far from eliminating risk from the economic system, financial futures actually pose new risks to its efficient functioning, especially in terms of productive sectors. The second way in which the markets for financial futures may disrupt the efficient functioning of the economic system relates to the second function which these markets fulfil: speculation. Fitzgerald argues that derivatives markets enable speculators 'to back their forecasts with a high degree of leverage'. 41 Indeed, insofar as Lillian Chew can be assumed to be correct when she suggests that derivatives 'offer boundless leverage', 42 then there would appear to be very little standing in the way of these 'forecasts' being turned into subsequent realities. Financial futures markets now act as important influences on the dynamics through which interest and exchange rates are set. As a consequence, derivatives trading also impacts directly on the real economy. As we have seen, productive sectors have been adversely affected by activities in cash markets which have raised the trend level of interest and exchange rates. Moreover, these disequilibrating effects have been multiplied as the speculative activities of derivatives traders have injected new sources of volatility into financial prices.
To explain this further, the futures markets no longer attract only those with passive hedging strategies. Whilst these markets were initiated in order to enable risks to be 27 offset through hedging, their growth has encouraged a more aggressive stance from financial investors. Derivatives can be moulded into any structure desired by potential customers. In this sense, innovation within the financial futures markets is, to a large degree, 'demand-pull'. That is, speculators in the derivatives markets have demanded new, highly liquid futures contracts which offer them expanded profit opportunities.
Futures not only act as a means of price protection, then; nor do they allow merely for profits to be realised from arbitrage between a portfolio of primary securities and related derivatives contracts. When used in either of these ways, the operation of futures markets has only a tangential effect on the productive economy. However, such effects become significantly more pronounced when futures markets are used to realise profits through pure speculation.
Financial futures markets are now used more for speculative purposes than they are for hedging. 43 At face value, speculation would seem to involve accepting additional risk. It is somewhat ironic that futures markets were originally established to allow investors to hedge against risk but, as these markets have been used to an ever greater extent for speculative reasons, they appear to have encouraged investors to take on more risks.
However, the image of speculation as risk-taking is difficult to maintain in relation to futures markets. Speculators have a hands-on influence in the formation of prices in these markets, and this immediately increases their ability to 'know' the direction in which the market will move. In effect, they are no longer attempting to predict the direction in which the market will move at all, only the extent to which the market will move in the designated direction. To put this another way, it is not a question of whether 28 futures speculators will make a loss or a gain, merely a question of how much profit they will realise. Economics textbooks routinely refer to speculative activity as the attempt to take advantage of marginal differences between the given prices of underlying cash instruments and related futures contracts. In practice, though, these prices are anything but given. In fact, they are constantly in flux as a response to the activities of speculators themselves. Speculators are able to increase their own profit margins by opening up price differentials between cash and futures markets through concerted one-way betting.
As Carlton notes, it is a peculiarity of the structure of futures markets that they will produce a price 'that reflects some average of the beliefs of the market participants'. 44 It is this pricing structure which enables speculators to exploit self-fulfilling prophecies should all 'bets' in the market prove to be one way. Futures markets are consequently dominated by momentum trading. As the market trend embodied in momentum trading becomes readily identified, the volume of trading tends to increase as more and more investors become aware that the trend can, indeed, be their friend. This 'knowledge' increases the liquidity of the market, encouraging more investors to join on the side of the dominant bet and, as a result, deepening the momentum of the market trend.
The advent of momentum trading clearly illustrates, particularly in relation to the operation of financial futures markets, that it is more useful to think of capital mobility in functional terms rather than in spatial terms. Indeed, the very existence of derivatives markets appears to be dependent upon the spatial mobility of capital hypothesis being incorrect. Under the conditions of this hypothesis, capital is assumed to have a privileged vantage point from which it can survey all of its available options. It is therefore able to 29 identify those economies in which it would be able to earn the highest interest premiums and, as a result of its rational instincts, will move quickly to exploit these profit opportunities. The subsequent flow of capital across space will impact upon domestic money supplies in such a way so as to eliminate the interest rate differentials which triggered the spatial capital flows in the first place. We are thus drawn towards a central assumption of the globalisation hypothesis: that all domestic interest rates will, over time, be 'policed' by speculative activity towards an international average. relationship embodied in trading the same financial instrument between primary and secondary markets. As a consequence, shocks emerging in one market are unlikely to be contained within that market alone. Indeed, the derivatives markets act as a diffusion mechanism, transferring one market's shocks into a number of other markets.
In the presence of such spill-over effects, public policy becomes increasingly difficult to co-ordinate. Monetary policy, in particular, becomes less exact. The explosion in the volume of derivatives contracts currently being traded is associated with an increase in the volatility of interest rates. However, the rate of interest no longer reflects solely the state of underlying economic fundamentals. As such, and contrary to the most basic law of textbook economics, the demand for money has become increasingly divorced from its price. That is, the demand for money has now become increasingly de-sensitised to fluctuations in interest rates. Thus, whilst derivatives contracts enable the financial markets to overcome obstacles to their efficient functioning, they also remove the government's capacity to engage in macroeconomic management on its own terms. If this capacity is to be restored, then the financial markets' ability to innovate at will must 31 be brought to heel. It is this assertion which dominates calls for the re-regulation of financial markets and also, therefore, the conclusion of this paper.
Conclusion: The case for strategic re-regulation
The scope of this paper is inadequate for any detailed discussion of the most effective means of re-regulating the international financial environment. It is sufficient at this stage merely to challenge one of the most entrenched orthodoxies of our times: that relating to capital's supposed 'hyper-mobility'. As such, this paper has had two main themes running through it. Firstly, it has been shown that the spatial mobility of capital is far more limited than it is made to appear in the political rhetoric of globalisation. As a consequence, and in direct contradiction of the received wisdom, this has demonstrated that the strategic re-regulation of financial markets remains possible (albeit, in all likelihood, only at a supra-national level). Secondly, by focusing subsequently on the question of the functional mobility of capital, it has been shown that there are compelling reasons, of both an economic and a political nature, to argue that the re-regulation of financial markets is not only possible, but also necessary.
The overriding aim of any new legislation would be to encourage the restoration of the full circuit of capital; that is, to use political interventions to create an economic environment in which there are sufficient incentives for those that hold financial assets to turn these assets into productive investments. The functional immobility of capital 32 impedes the flow of funds into production. In order to create a new market equilibrium which is more attentive to the needs of the real economy, it would appear to be necessary for a new regulatory regime to be inserted into market relations with a view to changing the relative incentives between holding capital as money and holding capital as productive assets. The goal of political interventions, then, would be to reduce the level of liquidity available in the financial sectors and, as a result, bring financial liquidity ratios more in line with those available in the real economy.
The successful restoration of the full circuit of capital is a necessary, although insufficient condition for the elevation of labour's relative position in the political hierarchy of global economic interests. Therefore, the prior re-regulation of financial market activity appears to be essential should we wish to see the end of restrictive labour practices based on the notion of competitive austerity. 45 For, driven by (empirically unsustainable) assumptions about capital's spatial mobility, western governments now routinely attempt to outbid each other in the inward investment game in relation to how competitively -and, for 'competitively', read 'cheaply' -they can market their respective workforces. According to the dominant discourse of globalisation, the presumed penalty for adopting any other stance is mass capital flight, as footloose investors search overseas for lower-cost locations. As a consequence, western growth is increasingly assumed to have become ever more dependent upon injecting a downward dynamic onto real wages. The result has been an increase in the ability of capitalist class actors to discipline the claims of labour on the one hand, and, in circumstances in which wage cuts are resisted, an increase in the under-employment of labour on the other. If we wish to live in a society whose political economy is significantly different to the one we experience today, then it has been the argument of this paper that we must begin by re-regulating financial market activity.
It is in this sense that this article should be seen as contributing to the themes of the special issue. The 'P' has been put back into IPE in this case through reverting to the type of analysis which typified the classical political economy of the nineteenth century.
The arguments contained in this paper should have been seen as an attempt to repoliticise the received wisdom of globalisation through reasserting each of what Andrew Gamble calls the 'three key discourses' of that genre: the 'scientific'; the 'practical'; and the 35 'normative'. 47 The conventional focus on the spatial mobility of capital highlights primarily a 'scientific discourse', as it concentrates on the way in which the political economy of globalisation operates as a social system of enhanced exit options for capital.
In turn, the 'practical discourse' of policy tends merely to be read off from the assumption that the perfect spatial mobility of capital conjures a political logic of no alternative. However, the actual scientific status of such a claim is much in doubt.
Indeed, it is contradicted by the available empirical evidence, which suggests that it is necessary to play down the significance of the spatial mobility hypothesis. Instead, by emphasising the functional mobility of capital, the political context for economic policymaking appears far less closed than it is made to look in the received wisdom of globalisation. Moreover, the adoption of this latter theoretical perspective allows once more for a 'normative discourse', concerning the ideal form of state-economy relations, to be injected into economic interpretations of the globalisation phenomenon.
In fact, the terms on which such a phenomenon is to be understood are fundamentally Therefore, the attempt to put the 'P' back into IPE in this instance signifies a desire to repoliticise the way in which the essentially political construction of globalisation is viewed. In this sense, then, the 'new' international political economy advanced here relates more closely to the development of 'new' modes of analysis. 
